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THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND: VOLUNTARY 
INTEGRATION OF SEXUAL MINORITIES 
INTO THE U.S. MILITARY 
Jennifer Gerarda Brown* & Ian Ayres** 
"The human heart is the starting point of all matters pertaining to war." 
- Marshal Maurice de Saxe1 
"What we do and what we think is fascinatingly dependent, much of the 
time, on what we believe that other people do and think." 
I. INTRODUCTION 
- Cass Sunstein2 
Many opponents of gays in the military will accept the proposition 
that gay and lesbian soldiers,3 most of them closeted, have served their 
country bravely and well. General Colin Powell has referred to gay 
service members as "proud, brave, loyal, good Americans"4 who have 
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Meyer, Kenji Yoshino, and workshop participants at UCLA, USC, Colorado, Georgetown, 
and Australian National universities. Jessica Ballou, Gowri Ramachandran, Eric McGrew, 
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1. Marshal Maurice de Saxe, My Reveries Upon the Art of War (1757), in ROOTS OF 
STRATEGY: A COLLECTION OF MILITARY CLASSICS 177 (Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Phillips 
trans., ed., 1940). 
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Situationism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 13, 2000, at 42, 46 
(reviewing MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A 
BIG DIFFERENCE (2000)). 
3. For simplicity's sake, we will use the terms "gay and lesbian" to refer to sexual 
minorities of various sorts, especially gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered 
people. We do not mean to treat all sexual minorities monolithically, because important 
differences might make our proposal more workable for some groups than for others. Cf. 
Diane H. Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis of Sex: Must Gay Women Be Admitted 
to the Military Even if Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 953 (1997) (arguing that men and 
women could legitimately receive disparate treatment with respect to the ban on 
homosexuality in the military). Similarly, and again for simplicity's sake, we will often use 
the term "soldier" to refer to service members of all branches of the military, and "army" to 
refer to the military generally. 
4. 1993 Defense Budget House Hearing, 102d Cong., at 45 (1993). 
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"served well in the past and are continuing to serve well."5 General H. 
Norman Schwartzkopf agrees: "homosexuals have served in the past 
and have done a great job serving their country. "6 
What these opponents find harder to accept is the proposition that 
heterosexual people can effectively serve their country if openly gay 
people are in the military with them. The fear is that if openly gay and 
lesbian people are allowed to serve, they will make other soldiers 
uncomfortable. This discomfort will cause a breakdown in morale and 
discipline, destroying the "unit cohesion" that is essential for effective 
soldiering. 
To show that these fears have perpetuated an exclusion policy that 
is overbrcad, this Essay proposes the creation of inclusive commands 
in the U.S. military.7 Gay and non-gay soldiers would effectively 
volunteer for inclusive commands by answering "no" to the following 
question: Would you prefer to serve in a command without any gay 
personnel? Soldiers who were not willing to serve with gay people 
would be assigned to alternative, exclusive commands based upon 
their answer to the sorting question. Placement in an inclusive 
command would therefore be entirely voluntary. It bears emphasizing 
that the inclusive command would combine gay and nongay service 
members. The point of the proposal is not to create a segregated unit 
just for sexual minorities, for this might reinforce stereotypes and 
prejudice. A "gay" command would fail to address the unit cohesion 
problem head on. Therefore, the command should be "inclusive." 
This Essay also is an application of the theory of ambiguation,8 a 
concept we borrow from the work of Lawrence Lessig.9 Lessig argues 
that people can deploy rhetorical devices to change a society's shared 
understanding of the meaning conveyed by a given word or action. 
One of the rhetorical devices Lessig discusses is "ambiguation," which 
gives "the particular act, the meaning of which is to be regulated, a 
second meaning as well, one that acts to undermine the negative 
effects of the first. "10 The very act of saying that you are willing to 
5. S. Hrg. No. 103-845, Ex. JX-1, vol. 3, at 707. 
6. Id. at 612 (testimony of Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf). 
7. A command is any military unit, post, district, or region under the control of one 
officer. This could be an Air Force base, an Army hospital, or a single submarine. We delib­
erately use the rather general term "command" here to leave open the many possibilities for 
implementing our proposal. Some types of commands are easier to integrate than others. A 
hospital or medical unit even today would contain a higher proportion of openly gay, 
lesbian, and bisexual service members than an infantry unit in the U.S. Marines. 
8. See IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: MOBILIZING 
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GA y RIGHTS, ch. 5 (forthcoming 2005) (discussing the 
strategy of ambiguation and its applicability to issues of sexual orientation). 
9. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1010 
(1995). 
10. Id. 
152 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:150 
serve with gay soldiers might make some people wonder whether you 
yourself are gay. As the set of people who are understood possibly to 
be gay expands, people's understanding of what it means to be gay 
also changes, and stereotypes erode. 
The inclusive command would challenge some heterosexual 
soldiers to "come out" as supporters of gay rights and in so doing raise 
questions about their own sexuality. The fact that soldiers would be 
forced to answer the question "yea" or "nay" marks a turn toward 
more uncomfortable choices. Some soldiers might prefer not to have 
to answer this type of question. But studies show that Americans age 
18-29 are less likely than the generation before them to support 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Indeed, a large 
majority of people in this age group believe that gay men and lesbians 
should be permitted to serve openly in the U.S. military. 1 1  When faced 
with the option, we will ultimately argue, many soldiers today will opt 
for the inclusive command. 
These changing attitudes also suggest an answer to skeptics who 
might protest that our proposal inappropriately calls for the military to 
engage in social engineering. The point is that tolerance for 
homosexuality has grown in American society, particularly among the 
age group most likely to serve in today's military. Granted, our 
proposal calls for innovative policy making and some willingness on 
the part of senior personnel to depart from well-worn rules. The goal 
is not simply to create new acceptance for sexual minorities, but to 
demonstrate that this acceptance already exists among large groups of 
potential recruits. 
We explicitly seek incremental progress. To that end, we propose 
two distinct, intermediate stages on the path toward non­
discrimination. In each stage, the military would ask recruits distinct 
questions, and the answers would have distinct consequences. The 
essential difference between the stages of integration is that in stage I, 
our system would not require any changes in the current "don't ask, 
don't tell" ("DADT") policy, and soldiers in both types of commands 
would remain closeted, but in stage II, DADT would be lifted for the 
inclusive command and service members assigned to that command 
would be free to speak openly about their sexual orientations. 
Let us begin with stage I. All soldiers would be asked two 
questions: 
Question No. 1 :  Your answer to this first question will be kept 
confidential (and your answer will have no effect on your future 
assignments or treatment). Would you be willing to serve in a 
command with openly gay service personnel? 
11. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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Question No. 2: Your answer to this second question will not be 
kept confidential. If you answer "no" you will be assigned to an 
"inclusive" command. If you answer "yes" you will be assigned to 
an "exclusive" command. Would you prefer to serve in a command 
without any gay personnel? 
The first question elicits information about whether service 
members are comfortable serving with openly gay colleagues. Since 
the answers to this question will be kept confidential, the question is 
likely to provide feedback on the level of discomfort, which is the 
premise for the "unit cohesion" concern. It also pushes recruits a bit to 
consider what they would be "willing" to do - a lower standard than 
what they might "prefer" to do. The question does not specify the 
conditions under which the recruit would be "willing" to serve with 
openly gay people (e.g., is this pursuant to an order or merely a 
request from commanding officers?). Even recruits who prefer not to 
serve with openly gay people might respond that they are "willing" to 
do so under some circumstance they imagine as they answer the 
question. 
The second question asks not about willingness to serve with 
openly gay people, but about preferences. To answer yes to the second 
question, a recruit must prefer not to serve with any gay personnel -
whether openly gay or closeted. On the one hand, the threshold for 
giving an anti-gay response to this question is lower than for Question 
1, because even recruits who dislike homosexuality and would prefer 
not to serve with anyone who is gay might be "willing" to serve with 
openly gay people if asked to do so. On the other hand, Question 2 
asks about preferences regarding any gay people, not just openly gay 
people. Some recruits might be unwilling to serve with openly gay 
people but neutral regarding service with closeted gay people (thus 
they would answer "no" to the second question, even though they are 
not willing to serve with openly gay people) . Although this may at first 
seem a perverse result, on closer examination it is consistent with the 
function of these questions to channel only the most prejudiced 
recruits into the exclusive command. Particularly in stage I, when 
DADT remains in effect even for the inclusive command, recruits who 
are neutral regarding closeted gay service members belong in the 
inclusive command. 
In stage II of this evolving plan of integration, the statutes and 
regulations comprising the DADT policy would require amendment 
to permit but not require gay and lesbian members of inclusive 
commands to come out. All soldiers would be asked a single question: 
Your answer to this question will not be kept confidential. If you 
answer "yes" you will be assigned to an "inclusive" command. If 
you answer "no" you will be assigned to an "exclusive" command. 
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Would you be willing to serve in a command with openly gay 
service personnel? 
In stage II, DADT would still be in effect for the exclusive 
command - so that soldiers who wanted to avoid serving with openly 
gay soldiers could do so. But in the second stage, the inclusive 
command would become a space in which openly gay and lesbian 
soldiers could serve their country and willing heterosexual soldiers 
could serve with them. Even stage II would be an intermediate, 
evolutionary step in the progression from exclusion, through DADT, 
to the ultimate goal: mandatory, wholesale integration of sexual 
minorities into the armed services. 
The inclusive command would help to unpack and challenge the 
changing justifications for disqualifying gay people from military 
service. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
rationales were always centered on the gay soldiers themselves: they 
were said to be security risks, mentally unstable,12 cowardly,13 and 
lacking in discipline.14 Over time, however, these rationales started to 
erode. This change was inevitable as highly decorated, clearly effective 
soldiers came out or were exposed as gay or lesbian.15 The many 
12. MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE 
113-18 (1993). According to Akhil Amar and Alan Hirsch, the official policy against gays in 
the military resulted largely from "historical accident": 
Many soldiers returned .from World War I suffering from shell shock. The emerging 
psychiatric profession offered to help the government minimize such problems in the future 
by screening soldiers to keep out the mentally ill or poorly adjusted. At the time, 
homosexuality was regarded as a mental illness, so the screening policy kept identified 
homosexuals out of the armed forces. 
AKHIL REED AMAR & ALAN HIRSCH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION 
REALLY SAYS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS 141 (1998). 
13. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE U.S. 
MILITARY 15 (1993) (quoting psychiatrist Albert Abrams, who wrote in his 1918 essay, 
"Homosexuality - A Military Menace," that "the homosexualist is not only dangerous, but 
an ineffective fighter"). 
14. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 118-19; Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A 
Critique of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 
234 (1996). 
15. See, e.g. , Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1236 (9th Cir. 1996) (concerning "a 
highly decorated nurse" who received the Bronze Star for distinguished service in Vietnam 
but who was discharged because she was a lesbian); Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (concerning "an exceptional midshipman" who earned "the respect and praise of his 
superior officers" and for whom "the sky was the limit" who was discharged from the Naval 
Academy two weeks before graduation because he disclosed his homosexuality to a 
classmate); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) 
(concerning an openly gay man described as "an outstanding soldier" and repeatedly 
promoted during his twelve years of service during and after Vietnam conflict; when 
Watkins sued to prevent his discharge, the court ruled that the Army could not discharge 
Watkins on the basis of his sexual orientation because it was disclosed at the time Watkins 
was drafted); see also SHILTS, supra note 13 (describing the history of gay men and lesbians 
in the U.S. military and the occasional "purges" that would result in the exposure and 
termination of many gay and lesbian soldiers). 
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promotions and glowing reviews these soldiers received during their 
service showed that they had discipline and courage. 16 The almost 
universal opm1on within the psychiatric community that 
homosexuality is not a mental illness17 made it untenable for the 
military to argue that gay people were inherently less stable than any 
other group. The illogic of the ban started to become clear as gay 
rights advocates pointed out that emotional problems and security 
breaches were more likely to occur if soldiers were forced to hide their 
sexual orientation; lifting the ban would mitigate rather than 
aggravate these risks. 
Nonetheless, when President Bill Clinton proposed to lift the ban 
upon taking office in early 1993, Congress balked. Ultimately, the 
compromise DADT policy emerged - a policy which, in theory, 
forbids military officials from asking whether soldiers are gay or 
lesbian, but also forbids gay and lesbian soldiers to be open about 
their orientation.18 While this policy may have many flaws, 19 the 
16. See MARY ANN HUMPHREY. MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE: EXPERIENCES 
OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT (1990). 
17. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 261-83, 380 (3d ed. 1980); SHILTS, supra note 13, at 715; Am. Med. Ass'n, Health 
Care Needs of the Homosexual Population, at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_ 
online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-160.991.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2004) (calling 
for a "physician's nonjudgmental recognition of sexual orientation" and instructing 
physicians to "oppose[ ) . . .  therapy that is based upon the assumption that homosexuality 
per se is a mental disorder"). 
18. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (b)(l) (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part: 
(b) Policy. -A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces under 
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the following findings is 
made ... 
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage 
in a homosexual act or acts ... 
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is homosexual or bisexual ... 
(3) That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same 
biological sex. 
The "don't ask" portion of the policy is contained in a regulation which states that 
"[a]pplicants for enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to 
reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual." Dep't of Def. Directive No. 
1304.26, encl. 1, 'j[ E 1.2.8.1 (Dec. 21, 1993). See also Dep't of Def. Directive Nos. 1332.30 & 
1332.14 (applying "don't ask" policy to officers and enlisted service members, respectively, 
in the course of their service). Thus, while the "don't tell" part of the policy is enshrined in 
statute, the "don't ask" portion is "strictly a regulatory creation." Kenji Yoshino, 
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell'', 108 YALE L.J. 485, 539 (1998). 
19. Not the least of these flaws is the fact that discharges due to homosexuality have 
accelerated rather than slowed since its inception. See Philip Shenon, Pentagon Moving to 
End Abuses of' Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at Al (noting that 
67% more gay and lesbian troops were discharged in 1997 - a total of 997 individuals -
than were discharged in 1994, the first full year the DADT policy was in effect). More recent 
drops in discharges are due to America's temporary involvement in war rather than any 
permanent shift in the practical effects of the policy. See John Files, Study Says Discharges 
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Congressional debates leading to its implementation achieved 
something valuable: they showed that some rationales for the ban on 
gays in the military seem to be off the table. Security risks, cowardice, 
and mental illness of gay people have, for the most part, lost 
respectability in this debate. 
The argument shifted. The new mantra became "unit cohesion." 
Indeed, when gay and lesbian service members have challenged the 
DADT policy, the government has defended not by raising any of the 
old justifications for the homosexual exclusion policy, but by resting 
upon "unit cohesion," protecting "the privacy of heterosexuals," and 
reducing "sexual tension."20 
If we unpack "unit cohesion," however, we see that the point of 
concern has actually shifted; the anticipated source of rule violations, 
breakdown in discipline, and insubordination has changed. The 
problem, it turns out, is not so much the gay soldier himself, but the 
reaction he is likely to elicit in others: their fear of the "gay gaze," 
their feelings of invaded privacy, their hostility. Put more pointedly, 
the fear is not so much that openly gay soldiers will violate military 
rules or underperform, but rather that one soldier's open 
homosexuality will cause another soldier to fall short in executing his 
duties.21 
Interestingly, the "unit cohesion" argument thus works in precisely 
the opposite direction from "diversity" rationales for affirmative 
action in higher education. In the educational context, the argument is 
that everyone will learn more, and more effectively, if the students 
bring to the enterprise a diverse array of experiences, some of which 
may flow from their personal characteristics, such as gender, race, age, 
Continue Under 'Don 't Ask, Don't Tell' , N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2004, at A18 (suggesting that 
America's involvement in war may counteract the otherwise steady increase in discharges of 
homosexuals, and noting that 787 were discharged in 2003, "the lowest number since 1995," 
compared with 906 in 2002 and 1,273 in 2001); Beth Fouhy, Soldier Dismissed After 
Revealing He's Gay, FindLaw, at http:/lnews.findlaw.com/ap_stories/a/w/1152/6-21-2004/2004 
0621051504_ 40.html (June 21, 2004) (noting that 770 people were discharged for homo­
sexuality in 2003, a reduction from 1,227 discharges in 2001, "before the invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq"). 
20. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd on other 
grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The government does not justify its discrimination by 
reference to some defect in the performance of homosexuals, or claim that they represent a 
security risk as likely targets for blackmail," but instead "says that the Act helps foster unit 
cohesion, promotes the privacy of heterosexuals, and reduces sexual tensions.") 
21. Judge Eugene Nickerson came straight to the point in describing this rationale: 
"[T]he known presence of homosexuals may disrupt the unit because heterosexual members 
may morally disapprove of homosexuals. This is an outright confession that 'unit cohesion' is 
a euphemism for catering to the prejudices of heterosexuals." Id. See also Yoshino, supra 
note 18, at 553 ("[T]he justifications for 'don't ask, don't tell' - unit cohesion, privacy, and 
sexual tension - primarily focus not on the gay servicemember but on the straight 
servicemember. This can be counted as a pro-gay achievement, as it correctly traces the 
source of the dysfunction not to the gay servicemember, but to the straight service member." 
(internal footnote omitted)). 
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and religion Gust to name a few).22 In the military context, on the 
other hand, the fear seems to be that some forms of diversity will 
prove so challenging, so distracting, that soldiers' ability to learn and 
perform will be compromised. 
Military officials faced a similar dynamic when they proposed 
racial integration of the armed forces. Military commanders believed 
that white and black soldiers could not live and work together; morale, 
discipline, and unit cohesion would suffer. Notwithstanding these 
fears, officials determined that wholesale integration was necessary. 
Many contend that this integration has been a success, proving that 
prejudice and fear can be overcome when soldiers subject themselves 
to the discipline demanded by military life.23 While some critics have 
argued that the military should follow the same path in integrating 
the armed forces with respect to race and sexual orientation, 
Congressional repeal of DADT in the short term is unlikely. 
Therefore, this Essay proposes a more incremental approach, one that 
does not launch a direct, normative attack on DADT, but instead 
attempts to demonstrate that the policy rests upon fears that are 
baseless - even in a military setting. Stage I calls for changes that 
could be implemented by executive order, without Congressional 
action. 
If, as Judge Eugene Nickerson has asserted, "the only conceivable 
way that the presence of known homosexuals could undermine the 
cohesion of the unit is 'by the negative reactions of service members 
who disapprove of homosexuality,'"24 military officials should consider 
instituting policies that seek out and nurture heterosexual soldiers who 
are tolerant of homosexuality. Our proposal does just this by allowing 
the perpetrators and victims of discrimination to voluntarily separate 
themselves into two distinct groups. 
As a purely descriptive matter, our screening mechanism is likely 
to have two channeling functions that would be mutually reenforcing. 
First, gay soldiers would likely opt for the inclusive command. While 
gay and lesbian soldiers could also opt for an exclusive command,25 the 
22. See, e.g. , Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (characterizing a diverse 
university student body is a compelling state interest, and observing that diversity creates 
substantial educational benefits); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
23. See CHARLES c. MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE: BLACK 
LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996) (suggesting the military 
has become the most race-egalitarian institution in American society). 
24. Able, 968 F. Supp. at 859 (quoting Philips v. Perry, 106 F. 3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 
1997)). 
25. Closeted gay individuals often find other gays or gay allies threatening, if for 
different reasons than intolerant individuals find them threatening. See BYRNE FONE, 
HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 6 (2000) ("Homophobia is not limited to heterosexuals, of 
course. It can also be found among . . .  repressed homosexuals."). This might stem from a 
fundamental fear of being outed, either within the military, or within their personal lives, 
and will cause some gay soldiers to opt for the exclusive command. 
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screening mechanism would probably reduce their incentives to do 
so.26 After all, fellow soldiers in the exclusive command are there 
because they've expressed a preference not to serve with any gay 
people. 
Second, intolerant heterosexual soldiers are likely to opt for the 
exclusive command. Intolerant soldiers - taking into account the 
channeling effect on gay soldiers - can reduce their expected contact 
with gay soldiers by opting for the exclusive command. And intolerant 
soldiers are also likely to be less willing to ambiguate their own 
sexuality by expressing even minimal support for gay rights. 
The remaining individuals - those who don't fall into either of 
these two categories - might be classified as tolerant heterosexuals. 
They are neither gay (who we expect, overall, will choose the inclusive 
command), nor facially intolerant toward gays (who we expect will 
choose the exclusive command). As we discuss in depth later, the 
choice made by these individuals is more complex, and may depend in 
part on the magnitude of the two channeling effects. Tolerant soldiers 
will be less likely to choose the exclusive command if it is a small, 
stigmatized group. But they will also be less likely to join the inclusive 
command if it is small enough to potentially mark them as gay. 
This Essay's argument unfolds in three steps. Section II will 
explain how the inclusive command would deliver the benefits of 
amelioration, demonstration, and realignment. Section III will put our 
proposal in context by presenting a brief history of exclusion and 
integration in the U.S. military, with a focus on women and racial 
minorities. In this section we will also consider briefly the racial 
integration of schools. Our contention will be that strategies of 
segregated inclusion and voluntary integration have facilitated 
transition to subsequent, mandatory integration, and that analogous 
strategies might be effective as gay men and lesbians take their turn at 
full integration in the military. 
Section IV will describe the inclusive command approach to 
integrating sexual minorities into the military, and examine several 
problems related to implementation. In conclusion, we will argue that 
26. Indeed, we perversely considered returning to the rule of total exclusion with regard 
to the exclusive command as a way of further bolstering the tendency of gays to choose the 
inclusive command. Under this alternative, the military was able to "ask" and then remove 
gay and lesbian soldiers from the exclusive command. Soldiers who are on the fence would 
arguably feel less comfortable opting into such a system, and thus choose the inclusive 
command. In equilibrium, most gay soldiers would be better off than the current regime 
because they would be able to opt for a safer environment, the inclusive command, and a 
greater number of soldiers overall may participate. But in the end, we reject this idea. The 
idea of retrenchment to total exclusion, even if limited to the exclusive command, is too 
unpalatable to be proposed. But see JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE 
MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 1 (1999) (noting that "don't ask, don't tell" is "much, much 
worse than" total exclusion since it achieves essentially the same ends, but in a way which is 
less offensive and less easily contestable). 
October 2004] The Inclusive Command 159 
we must not allow the "don't ask, don't tell" policy to set the 
parameters for gay participation in the U.S. military. Given the 
continuing centrality of military service in many conceptions of full 
citizenship, as well as the substantial material benefits that accompany 
service in the armed forces, this issue deserves all of the energy we can 
muster to jump-start the debate. We must find new ways to integrate 
openly gay people into military life. 
II. THE BENEFITS OF SELF-SEGREGATION 
The tendency of self-segregation by intolerant heterosexuals into 
the exclusive command and by tolerant heterosexuals and gay and 
lesbian soldiers into the inclusive command will produce three distinct 
types of benefits: amelioration (of current discrimination), 
demonstration (that the unit cohesion rationale does not require the 
exclusion or closeting of gay and lesbian soldiers), and realignment of 
political allies and enemies (creating a common cause for pro-gay 
legislators on the left and pro-defense legislators on the right). 
TABLE 1: EVOLVING EFFECTS OF THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND 
TYPE OF EFFECT STAGE I STAGE II 
AMELIORATION More supportive Speech and conduct 
environment discrimination 
Reduced chance of eliminated 
harassment, abuse, Safe haven for gays in 
outing, or witch hunts exclusive unit if outed 
or come out 
DEMONSTRATION Testing number of Testing whether 
soldiers willing to serve heterosexual and 
with gay people openly gay soldiers can 
Testing relative work together 
performance of effectively 
inclusive and exclusive Testing whether 
commands openly gay soldiers are 
more likely to violate 
military code 
REALIGNMENT Attract supporters of individual choice 
Attract supporters of unit cohesion 
Attract supporters of strong defense and boost 
recruitment 
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At first blush, the inclusive command concept might appear to 
aggravate rather than ameliorate discrimination in the military on the 
basis of sexual orientation. One of the clear consequences of the 
proposal is to create "safe" spaces, but those spaces protect both those 
who support and those who oppose the inclusion of gay men and 
lesbians in the military. The exclusive command, by insulating some 
soldiers from openly gay and lesbian fellow soldiers, might be seen as 
legitimizing the desire for such insulation. Granted, to the extent the 
inclusive command rests upon a system of "separate but equal" 
classifications, it will strike many readers as distasteful, and even quite 
harmful.27 Certainly, compared to a world in which gay and lesbian 
citizens are freely admitted into the service without restrictions 
peculiar to their sexual orientation, the inclusive command is not 
attractive. But if we take as our starting point the world we actually 
occupy, where the DADT policy constrains gay peoples' speech and 
conduct, heterosexuals are never given the opportunity to show that 
they are capable of working effectively with openly gay soldiers, and 
gay people are regularly discharged from the service because of their 
sexual orientation, the inclusive command gains important ground, if 
only as a set of temporary strategies. At the very least, the inclusive 
command increases the options available to gay and heterosexual 
soldiers, and thus improves their situations. 
The inclusive command would ameliorate the discriminatory 
character of the DADT policy in the day-to-day lives of gay soldiers. 
In stage I, the inclusive command would ease the lives of gay and 
lesbian soldiers by allowing them to work in units filled with fellow 
soldiers who have suggested that they are not prejudiced with respect 
to sexual orientation. In the inclusive unit, this reduction in prejudice 
would presumably lead to a drop in homophobic jokes and comments, 
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, and other anti-gay 
behavior.28 These benefits would be felt immediately, because it would 
27. Some readers might even wonder if it is constitutional. The answer is almost 
certainly yes. The constitutionality of the current "don't ask, don't tell" policy has been 
bitterly debated but generally upheld. See Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280 (2d Cir. 1996), 
remanded to 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 155 F. 3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'! Guard, 124 F.3d 
1126 (9th Cir. 1997). Our proposal is Jess burdensome on gay, lesbian, and bisexual service 
members than that policy. Moreover, in a constitutional system that reviews classifications 
based on sexual orientation under the most easily satisfied "rational basis" test, the military 
should be able to show that the system is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. Indeed, courts have traditionally shown great deference to military decision 
making, given the national security interests involved. 
28. In theory, this atmosphere should currently exist in the military. In the Navy, for 
example, the personnel chief, Vice Admiral Daniel T. Oliver, issued a memorandum on 
October 28, 1999 reminding commanding officers that they "must not condone homosexual 
jokes, epithets or derogatory comments, and must ensure a command climate that fosters 
respect for all individuals." Elizabeth Becker & Katherine Q. Seelye, The Military Orders 
Spot Check of Bases on Gay Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at Al. Yet these 
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not be necessary for gay and lesbian service members to be out of the 
closet in order to appreciate a more supportive environment. Simply 
knowing that their fellow service members are tolerant of 
homosexuality could ease the strain of DADT. Heterosexual service 
members in the stage I inclusive commands, as well, would feel some 
amelioration of the harassment and discrimination they can suffer if 
they express support for gay rights under the current regime. Even in 
stage I, while DADT still applies, the inclusive command would 
ameliorate discrimination by creating a space in which gay and non­
gay service members could safely and openly express their support for 
gay rights. 
In stage II, the inclusive command would ameliorate discrim­
ination even more dramatically. Because the DADT policy would no 
longer apply to inclusive commands at this stage, gay and lesbian 
soldiers would be permitted to be open about their orientation. The 
stage II inclusive command would alleviate the stress of secrecy that so 
many gay and lesbian soldiers must bear. It would give gay and lesbian 
soldiers the same rights of free speech enjoyed by heterosexual 
soldiers.29 Gay and lesbian service members who opt for the exclusive 
units could also benefit. Although DADT would continue to apply in 
exclusive commands, the consequences of that policy could be 
changed in time of transition. Closeted soldiers in the exclusive 
command whose sexual orientation became public (through their own 
decision to reveal it or because of others' investigations) could avoid 
discharge by transferring to an inclusive command. 
The inclusive command would also have evolving demonstration 
effects. In stage I, the inclusive command would demonstrate, if 
nothing else, the extent to which new recruits support gay rights. The 
first question directly solicits recruits' preferences about serving with 
policies are clearly not effective and the military knows it. A survey of service members 
conducted by the Department of Defense in 1999 revealed that 80% of soldiers had "heard 
offensive speech, derogatory names, jokes, or remarks about homosexuals in the last 12 
months," 85% "believed such comments were tolerated to some extent," and 37% said they 
had "witnessed or experienced an event or behavior toward a Service member that they 
considered to be harassment based on perceived homosexuality." OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY, at i-ii (2000). See also Francis X. Clines, 
Killer's Trial Shows Gay Soldier's Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1999, at A18 (noting the 
"months of vile name calling, rumor mongering," "harassment," and "taunting" that 
preceded the beating to death of Pfc. Barry Winchell "with a baseball bat as he slept in his 
barracks bed"). 
29. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S. 
Military's Don't Ask Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1 141 (1997) (noting that DADT 
implicitly requires gay and lesbian soldiers, even when silent as to their sexual orientation, 
falsely to affirm assumptions that they are heterosexual). 
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gay soldiers. Because this question is confidential and unrelated to the 
respondent's assignment or career path, it provides powerful 
information into whether DADT is necessary as a recruitment 
device.30 
Moreover, the second question facilitates a limited test of the unit 
cohesion hypothesis itself. The self-segregating of people based upon 
attitudes toward homosexuality would allow military commanders to 
measure and compare the performance of these two distinct groups of 
people. Under some versions of the "unit cohesion" theory, one might 
expect soldiers in the exclusive command to work more effectively 
(because they were less likely to have to interact with gay colleagues). 
But this prediction can be tested. We might find that the service 
members who selected the inclusive unit work more effectively with 
people who are different from them in multiple ways than do those 
who express unwillingness to serve with homosexuals. Or it is possible 
that both groups would perform better when segregated than they do 
when mixed together under the current system. These are empirical 
questions that are impossible to answer a priori. But even while 
DADT still applies in stage I, the inclusive command creates a 
structure for gathering data and comparing the performance of people 
with distinctly different attitudes toward homosexuality.31 
In the second stage, when gay and lesbian members of the inclusive 
command are permitted to be open about their orientation, a broader 
test of the unit cohesion theory is possible. It would then be possible 
to test whether heterosexual soldiers are rendered somehow less 
effective by the "gay gaze" - that is, when they work along side 
openly gay colleagues.32 
30. Recent data suggest that it is not, as people in the 18- to 29-year-old age group show 
increasing levels of acceptance for homosexuality. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
31. During stage II, it will become possible for commanders to identify a greater number 
of service members as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. This in turn will permit some comparison, as 
performance levels of gay, lesbian, and bisexual service members are measured against 
nongay members. This could be a positive development, as long as gay service members are 
held to the same standards as nongay members. See Yoshino, supra note 18, at 544 (noting 
the way DADT prevents gay and lesbian service members from disproving the assumption 
that openly gay personnel cannot serve effectively). 
32. In theory, it should be possible to test this even now. In some military settings, gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual service members have been permitted to serve even after commanders 
and fellow service members become aware of their homosexuality. Commanders of such 
units could test the unit cohesion hypothesis by tracking performance levels before and after 
the date on which the service member's homosexuality became widely known. While 
theoretically possible, such studies are unlikely to occur because a commander might violate 
DADT if he or she fails to initiate discharge proceedings against an openly gay service 
member. Thus the commander's self interest precludes an admission that the gay service 
member's homosexuality is or was widely known within the unit. 
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Gay and lesbian soldiers have already demonstrated that the early 
rationales for exclusion - emotional instability, security risks, and 
ineffectiveness - were without merit. But these men and women 
could only show that closeted gays could serve effectively. Never have 
we created an environment in which openly gay people could prove 
their abilities without fear of official reprisal.33 The inclusive command 
takes us that additional step. And it takes us there not by creating a 
segregated unit just for gays34 (as the United States has at times 
maintained for African-American and Japanese-American soldiers), 
for this would prove only that gays could serve in units reserved for 
gays. An exclusively gay command would fail to address the unit cohe­
sion problem head-on. Only a regime that places gay and non-gay sol­
diers together - bunk-to-bunk, shoulder-to-shoulder, showerhead-to­
showerhead - can prove that openly gay people can serve and (per­
haps more importantly) that heterosexual people can serve with them. 
The final effect of the inclusive command would be a realignment 
of political interests. By allowing gay people to serve without forcing 
uncomfortable heterosexual people to serve with them, the inclusive 
command structure could create a common cause for gay rights 
advocates on the left and various groups of conservative legislators on 
the right. This effect would be particularly pronounced in stage I, 
when DADT remains in place for both types of commands. Indeed, 
during stage I, the inclusive command proposal appears to be Pareto 
superior to the current DADT system, as every relevant participant's 
position improves. By channeling gay and lesbian soldiers toward the 
inclusive command, the sorting mechanism employed in stage I would 
33. This may be an overstatement with respect to individuals. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some openly gay service members have been permitted to serve and have even 
received promotions. Their success seems to turn on the tolerance of commanders and 
extent to which circumstances create a demand for their presence. See, e.g. , Nathaniel Frank, 
Gays and Lesbians at War: Military Service in Iraq and Afghanistan under "Don't Ask, 
Don't Tell," Working Paper, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, 
University of California, Santa Barbara (September 15, 2004), available at http://www. 
gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/Frank091504_GaysAtWar.doc (noting that sexual minor­
ities serve on the front lines of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
taking combat and combat-support roles as officers and enlisted personnel in the Army, Air 
Force, Navy, and Marines, and that despite DADT, many serve openly or are known to a 
majority of the troops in their unit); HUMPHREY, supra note 16, at 248-57 (noting an openly 
gay man who served and received promotions during Vietnam war). Unfortunately, most of 
the evidence of service by openly gay personnel tends to be anecdotal. The military cannot 
acknowledge the extent to which commanders tolerate and even support the continued 
service of openly gay members, since such commanders are technically violating DADT. 
34. This was proposed by Miriam Ben-Shalom at the beginning of the crisis in the 
Persian Gulf. She wrote to President George H.W. Bush suggesting the formation of a "gay 
command" consisting of current and former service members who were gay or lesbian. She 
pointed out that the government could save thousands in training costs by deploying these 
soldiers, who were ready and willing to serve. See SHILTS, supra note 13, at 727. 
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give homophobic service members a greater sense of insulation from 
homosexuality in the exclusive command. Finally, stage I should also 
dominate DADT in the minds of the military commanders who are 
morally neutral on homosexuality but fear, in a purely instrumental 
way, the effect integration will have on unit cohesion. Allowing people 
to sort according to their attitudes toward homosexuality could 
actually boost unit cohesion in both the inclusive and the exclusive 
commands. Indeed, it seems the only people who would not be made 
better off by the move to inclusive commands would be people who do 
not like gay people and derive enjoyment from harassing and harming 
them. It would be surprising to hear any legislator argue publicly that 
the interests of such people must be included in the calculus. 
A less positive way to describe the realignment effect is that an 
inclusive command might create a wedge in traditional anti-gay 
coalitions, giving legislators who are generally unsympathetic to gay 
rights a reason to defect from their usual political alignment. For 
example, a conservative law maker might tell her constituents that the 
inclusive command will more fairly distribute the burdens and dangers 
of military service, requiring gay and lesbian as well as heterosexual 
citizens to show their patriotism.35 Particularly when the military has 
great need for soldiers (such as when the country is waging an 
unpopular war, or a strong peacetime economy makes it more difficult 
to find talented recruits; or, as is arguably the case in 2004, multiple 
commitments around the globe are taxing some branches of the 
military to capacity36), conservative legislators might see greater 
appeal in a policy that finds a way to include gay citizens in the 
military.37 Indeed, between 1999 and 2004, DADT caused the armed 
forces to discharge nearly 1,000 service members who possessed 
special skills needed in Iraq;· an inclusive command might have 
provided a way to retain those members.38 The fact that the exclusive 
command offers some soldiers a way to decrease their probability of 
35. See Akhil Reed Amar, Second Thoughts: What the Right to Bear Arms Really Means, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1999, at 24. Professor Amar argues for universal, "compul­
sory or quasi-compulsory national service, with both military and nonmilitary alternatives." 
Id. at 26. 
36. See Eric Schmitt, Other Services Eyed by Army for Recruiting, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2004, at Al. 
37. See Nathaniel Frank, Why We Need Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2003, 
at A43 (eliminating the ban on openly gay service members would promote national security 
and military readiness). 
38. See Press Release, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, Univ. of 
Cal., Santa Barbara, Mission-Critical Specialists Discharged For Homosexuality: New Data 
Reveal Extensive Talent Loss Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell (June 21, 2004), at http:l/www. 
gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press_rel_2004_0621.htm. 
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serving with gays only adds to the appeal for socially conservative 
legislators. At the very least, the inclusive command could give 
conservative legislators who support a strong national defense a way 
to trade off the benefits of a potentially larger, stronger military 
against the "moral values" that would otherwise lead them to oppose 
any expansion in gay rights. 
Initially, one might suspect that liberals would be against an 
inclusive command because it doesn't go far enough in eliminating 
DADT, while implicitly condoning and legitimizing anti-gay sentiment 
by making it the basis for a new exclusive command. However, when 
framed as part of a broader goal (the move from stage I, to stage II, to 
full integration) liberals should accept the program, if only as 
necessary data gathering to support their position.39 
III. HISTORICAL PARALLELS 
The foregoing arguments for incremental progress are likely to be 
offensive to readers impatient for a simple regime of non­
discrimination. We share this impatience. But it is useful to remember 
that neither racial integration of our schools nor of the military 
occurred in one fell swoop. Instead, various intermediate forms of 
(admittedly discriminatory) inclusion were important precursors to the 
ultimate mandate of integration. This section reminds us of these 
histories to make more plausible the idea that intermediate steps of 
the kind suggested in our proposal might be a necessary evil. 
The history of racial integration of public education might, in 
stylized fashion, be broken into four core stages: exclusion, segregated 
inclusion, voluntary integration, and mandatory integration. In the 
exclusion stage, African-American children in the United States were 
at first denied the right to education. The country then moved to a 
system of segregated inclusion, the sort of "separate but equal" regime 
found constitutional in Plessy v. Furgeson.40 African-American 
children were permitted to go to school, but only to schools designated 
specifically for them. White children continued to attend schools that 
were exclusively white. 
39. Indeed, Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) heard Jennifer describe the idea at a 
conference and was so taken with it that he asked for a written description. Frank seems to 
be a great believer in pragmatic incrementalism, though, so perhaps he would take to the 
idea more easily than the average liberal politician. 
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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TABLE 2: STYLIZED STAGES OF INTEGRATION 
CORE STAGE RACE IN RACE IN SEXUAL 
EDUCATION MILITARY ORIENTATION 
IN MILITARY 
EXCLUSION African- African- Homosexual 
American Americans exclusion policy 
children denied denied the 
right to right to serve 
education 
SEGREGATED "Separate but Segregated Never used 
INCLUSION equal" schools units 
VOLUNTARY "Freedom of Never used Proposed 
INTEGRATION choice" inclusive 
Whites have commands 
option of 
busing to black 
schools 
White suburbs 




MANDATORY Nominal Integration Long-range goal 
INTEGRATION holding of order by 
Brown v. Board Truman 
of Education 
The crucial phase in any process of integration, well illustrated in 
the educational context, is mandatory integration. The U.S. Supreme 
Court's holdings in Brown v. Board of Education,41 followed by the 
remedial cases in which integration plans were approved and imposed 
"with all deliberate speed,''42 represent this mandatory stage. The 
Court's nominal holding in Brown v. Board of Education43 was to 
reject Plessy's segregated education system. In most cases, Brown was 
followed by either continued segregation or by various attempts to 
desegregate through voluntary action. Voluntary integration strategies 
have provided opportunities, in some areas, for school districts and the 
families within them to integrate proactively, through their own 
41. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
42. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301. For examples of such remedial plans, see Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. , 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 
(1974). 
43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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exercise of choice; these choices were made in the shadow of a 
mandatory norm. 
This Essay proposes an inclusive command strategy as an 
alternative to sweeping judicial reform analogous to Brown. This 
raises an important empirical question as to whether voluntary 
integration can succeed without a Brown-like Supreme Court ruling. It 
may be that other important actors, such as Congress {by virtue of 
amending the DADT policy, at least with respect to the inclusive 
command) or important military figures (such as H. Norman 
Schwartzkopf or Colin Powell, expressing support for the inclusive 
command) could similarly shift the background norms toward 
integration of sexual minorities.44 
Although most school districts skipped the voluntary integration 
stage, we can find some examples of it. It is important to acknowledge 
that voluntary integration almost always followed, rather than 
preceded, the articulation of an overarching norm of desegregation. 
To have any chance of success, voluntary integration strategies may 
require a prior statement, such as that in Brown, making clear that 
norms have changed. In practice, voluntary systems have been used to 
"ease in" the application of a court-imposed desegregation order. In 
theory, however, voluntary systems could precede the articulation of a 
mandatory norm. In the shadow of Brown, some localities adopted so­
called "freedom of choice" plans, which gave white and black families 
the option of participating in the integration of the schools. Because it 
was understood that white students would not opt to attend 
predominantly black schools and black students would be intimidated 
and pressured not to attend predominantly white schools, the 
"freedom of choice" plans were used by Southern school districts as a 
tool of resistance to court-imposed integration orders.45 Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court eventually struck down "freedom of choice" 
plans when other methods, such as rezoning, could more quickly 
achieve the ends of desegregation, the Court suggested that the 
concept could - at least in theory - be used to integrate schools 
fairly.46 
44. Such "norm entrepreneurs" can have dramatic effects on shared understandings of 
social meaning. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 929 (1996) (discussing how "norm entrepreneurs" can affect public discourse and, 
therefore, the shape of social norms). 
45. Cf CONSTANCE CURRY, SILVER RIGHTS: THE STORY OF THE CARTER FAMILY'S 
BRAVE DECISION TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO AN ALL-WHITE SCHOOL AND CLAIM 
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 29 (1995) (recounting the oral history of an African-American family 
who took advantage of "freedom of choice" policy and sent seven school-age children to a 
formerly all-white school, despite intense harassment and intimidation). 
46. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (striking down a "freedom of 
choice" plan when three years after implementation no white child had chosen to go to the 
formerly black school, and 85% of county's black students remained in that school). 
Regarding such plans generally, the Court stated, "If the means prove effective, it is 
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Volunteerism is still alive and well today as a dominant tool of 
desegregation. Several desegregation plans ask whether suburban 
school districts would volunteer to accept students who would be 
bused out from predominantly black urban districts.47 A strategy 
employing elements of volunteerism can be found in ever-popular 
magnet schools. Majority and minority families have the option of 
registering for such schools, and school districts attempt to lure a 
racially mixed group of students to these schools by offering special 
programs and resources there. Instead of mandated busing, the 
preference is for voluntary integration. 
The history of racial (and sexual)48 integration of the military is 
also partially analogous. As before, we did not move simply from a 
regime of exclusion to one of mandatory integration. As in the 
educational context, African-Americans were officially excluded from 
service at various points in our nation's history.49 
acceptable, but if it fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end." 
Id. at 440 (citation omitted). See also Vaughns v. Bd. of Educ., 627 F. Supp. 837 (D. Md. 
1985) (Prince George's County); Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 604 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (Cincinnati); Clark v. Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir. 1983) (Little Rock); 
United States v. Bd. of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 917, 924-26 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (Chicago); Flax 
v. Potts, 567 F. Supp. 859, 874 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (Fort Worth); United States v. Texas Educ. 
Agency, 679 F.2d 1104, 1110 (5th Cir. 1982) (Port Arthur); Arthur v. Nyquist, 514 F. Supp. 
1133, 1139 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (Buffalo); Smiley v. Voller!, 453 F. Supp. 463, 476 (S.D. Tex. 
1978) (Galveston), modified sub nom., Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1263 (S.D. Tex. 
1981). 
47. An en bane Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals approved a consent decree containing 
an interdistrict transfer provision in the St. Louis metropolitan area. Liddell v. Missouri, 731 
F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984). Other courts have commented 
generally on the advantages of interdistrict transfer arrangements as something states and 
suburbs might undertake voluntarily. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 
449, 488 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. 
Dist., 778 F.2d 404, 436 (8th Cir. 1985); Ross v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 222-
24 (5th Cir. 1983); Berry v. Sch. Dist., 698 F.2d 813, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1983); Paul Gewirtz, 
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
728, 781 n.179 (1986) (emphasizing the practical impact of Liddell, noting that by 1986 
approximately 7,000 black students had transferred from St. Louis schools to suburban 
schools, about one-fourth of the students who were attending all-black schools in St. Louis, 
and about 540 white suburban students had transferred to St. Louis schools). 
48. Women served in the armed forces only as nurses until World War II, when they 
began serving in various auxiliary corps. Charles C. Moskos, From Citizen's Army to Social 
Laboratory, 17 WILSON Q. 90 (Winter 1993). The auxiliary corps were sex-segregated in 
their barracks and for purposes of administration and promotion, but they went to work with 
men in regular units. In this sense they enjoyed greater integration than African-American 
soldiers in the time of race-segregated units. Women served primarily in administrative, 
clerical, and health-care positions until 1973, when the abolition of the draft created some 
scarcity in personnel. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, 
GENDER, AND THE LAW 343 (1997). In 1978, women's integration in the military gained 
further ground when Congress eliminated the separate women's auxiliary corps, permitting 
women to join all branches of the military and fill all roles save those involved in direct 
combat. See id. at 346. 
49. Like gay men and lesbians, African-Americans have always fought for this country 
(including the war for independence, before this country was a country). SHILTS, supra note 
13, at 7 ("Even before the armed forces of the United States were formally organized, gays 
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The objections to racial integration of the armed forces bear 
striking similarity to the anti-gay rhetoric that currently supports the 
ban on gays in the military.5° For example, in the Civil War, some 
Union generals "feared that the presence of black soldiers in the army 
would create disharmony and drive away white volunteers. "51 In 1940, 
Admiral W.R. Sexton wrote to the Secretary of the Navy that if 
"colored men" served in the Navy, "team work, harmony, and ship 
efficiency (would be] seriously handicapped" because of the attitudes 
of white sailors.52 As late as 1971,  Lieutenant General Edward 
Almond wrote that racial integration "weakens" the "efficiency" of 
the armed forces.53 As in the case of homosexuality, unit cohesion 
served as a general objection to the integration of the service by race. 
From nominal exclusion we moved (as in education) to a regime of 
segregated inclusion. After the Emancipation Proclamation, black 
men were officially allowed to enlist in the Union army during the 
Civil War as part of the "United States Colored Troops."54 Four black 
units fought in the Indian wars of 1870-90, and black soldiers also 
fought in Cuba, where they rode with Teddy Roosevelt as part of the 
Rough Riders.55 Racial segregation within the army continued during 
World War I and at the start of World War Il.56 
were bearing arms for the yet unborn nation."). Initially, black enlistments were officially 
forbidden by order of the Council of Generals. John Sibley Butler, Race Relations in the 
Military, in THE MILITARY: MORE THAN JUST A JOB? 118 (Charles C. Moskos & Frank R. 
Wood eds. 1988). The British offered the black men freedom if they would join the British 
ranks. In response, General George Washington told the Continental Congress that he 
would enlist black men notwithstanding the official prohibition, and this resulted in over five 
thousand black men serving the Colonial side in the Revolutionary War. Id. Black men were 
allowed to fight and die for this country's independence, but when the fighting ended they 
were excluded from any ongoing participation within military institutions. Id. 
50. Many high-ranking military officials acknowledge but explicitly refuse to entertain 
parallels between sexual orientation and race. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin 
Powell, a retired four-star general, has said that "as an African-American," he is "well aware 
of the attempts to draw parallels between" the military's stance on homosexuality "and 
positions used years ago to deny opportunities to African-Americans." He says, however, 
that "[s]kin color is a benign, non-behavioral characteristic. Sexual orientation is perhaps the 
most profound of human behavioral characteristics. Comparison of the two is a convenient 
but invalid argument." 139 CONG. REC. 2210 (1993) (letter of May 8, 1992, from Colin L. 
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Rep. Patricia Schroeder). 
51. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed 
Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 502 (1991). 
52. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 48, at 332. 
53. Id. 
54. Butler, supra note 49, at 118. As had happened earlier with the Revolutionary War, 
when the fighting ended in the Civil War, black men were again excluded from ongoing 
participation in the military. 
55. Id. 
56. The Army set a maximum quota for black soldiers to correspond with the propor­
tion of the general population that was black. The number of African-Americans in the ser­
vice never approached this maximum, reaching 5.9% on the eve of Pearl Harbor and, at its 
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But unlike education, the military moved directly from segregated 
inclusion to mandatory integration. When the U.S. suffered a shortage 
of combat personnel during WWII, platoons of black soldiers were 
ordered to serve in previously all-white companies, but this was not by 
choice of the black or white soldiers. This experimental combination 
was instead a move to mandatory integration, made complete with 
President Truman's Executive Order of 1948 officially outlawing 
segregation in the U.S. military.57 By the time the U.S. fought in 
Korea, black and white soldiers fought side by side without incident.58 
Stepping back, we see that racial integration of the military was 
incremental, but it bypassed the voluntary integration stage that has 
been much more present in the evolution of educational integration. 
So the natural question arises whether voluntary integration is needed 
with regard to sexual orientation. If this stage could be bypassed with 
regard to race (and sex), maybe it could be bypassed with regard to 
sexual orientation as well. 
Our answer is that the voluntary integration stage with regard to 
race might have been less needed because the military went through a 
stage of segregated inclusion that had sufficiently demonstrated the 
competence and valor of African-American soldiers. But if this is so, 
shouldn't we instead be embracing segregated integration (instead of 
voluntary integration) as the intermediate step to full integration? 
The problem here is that segregated integration of gays and 
lesbians (even if we wanted it) is really not feasible. The idea of 
segregated inclusion for gays and lesbians would mean "gay-only" 
units which would parallel the "black-only" or "women-only" units of 
the past. As a practical matter, the military does not have the option of 
highest during WWII, topping out at about 10% of total personnel. CHARLES C. MOSKOS, 
THE AMERICAN ENLISTED MAN: THE RANK AND FILE IN TODAY'S MILITARY 109-10 
(1970). The black units were usually used for heavy-duty labor and not combat. Id. at 110. 
57. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (1948). 
58. The history of racial integration in the other branches varied slightly from that of the 
Army. In 1 947, when the Air Force was established as separate from the Army, it began its 
own movements toward racial integration, and by 1950 the Air Force was largely integrated. 
In the Navy, black sailors served during the Civil War, but in the early twentieth century 
restrictions were imposed on their service, and by 1920 all black men were barred from 
enlisting. In 1932, black men were permitted to join the Navy as stewards in the messman's 
branch, and in 1942, some general service openings were allowed in segregated harbor and 
shore assignments. In 1944, the Navy took initial steps toward integration by assigning a 
small number of black men to general service on an ocean-going vessel. After WWII, the 
Navy took major steps toward integration, but even in 1970, African-Americans accounted 
for only 4 to 5% of total Navy personnel. See MOSKOS, supra note 56, at 1 12-13. By 1995, 
African-Americans constituted roughly 17% of Navy personnel. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 374 (1999) (Table 587: Department of 
Defense Manpower: 1 950 to 1997). In the Marine Corps, policy evolved from total exclusion 
of African-Americans before WWII, to segregated units of "heavy-duty laborers, 
ammunition handlers, and anti-aircraft gunners" in 1942, to full integration in 1949-50. 
MOSKOS, supra note 56, at 1 13. 
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using a segregated inclusion strategy, because gay men and lesbians 
have the option of remaining in the closet and thereby "passing" as 
heterosexual people.59 This passing strategy is generally not available 
to women or people of color. The closeting option means that any 
attempt to (exclude or) segregate on the basis of sexual orientation in 
an absolute sense is bound to fail.60 
The difficulty of passing in the context of race and the relative ease 
of doing so with orientation means that segregated inclusion could 
progress toward mandatory integration more effectively in the context 
of race than orientation. While black soldiers were able (actually 
required) to be "openly" black and simultaneously to demonstrate 
their abilities as soldiers, gay and lesbian soldiers have never had this 
opportunity. As soon as a soldier's orientation is known by her 
superiors, her resulting separation from the military prevents her from 
serving while openly gay. As Kenji Yoshino explains: 
[T]he military has been careful to rely on stereotypes that gays cannot 
disprove through infiltration. Because these stereotypes rely on what 
"open" or visible homosexuals will do to a unit, an invisible homosexual 
cannot, by definition, disprove the stereotype until she comes out of the 
closet. At that point, of course, she is generally removed from the 
military and the stereotype remains largely uncontested.61 
Thus, while racial integration could move directly from segregated 
inclusion to mandatory integration, the integration of sexual 
minorities may have to proceed with a different intermediate step to 
counter the effects of the closet. Voluntary integration suggests itself 
as a candidate in part because of the important role it has played and 
continues to play in the integration of public education. 
Our inclusive command proposal in essence is suggesting that the 
military use voluntary integration as a substitute for segregated 
inclusion as the core intermediate step, a step the military was able to 
skip in the context of race. The voluntary integration stage, as the 
name suggests, permits every participant to choose, fully informed and 
free of coercion, whether to join or avoid the integrated group. 
The history of racial and sexual integration suggests that potential 
demonstration effects of any system that creates segregated groups are 
not just hypothetical. For example, in 1977, the Army conducted a 
59. As Kenji Yoshino has argued, however, in the military context this invisibility option 
is disempowering rather than helpful to gay and lesbian soldiers. See Yoshino, supra note 18, 
at 544 (noting that DADT simultaneously dampens the empowering aspects and amplifies 
the disempowering aspects of gay invisibility). 
60. Perhaps the closest analog to segregated inclusion applicable to sexual orientation is 
the DADT policy currently in force. Just as segregated inclusion permitted the military to 
insulate white soldiers from the perceived threat or disruption of racial integration, so too 
DADT allows the military to include gay men and lesbians while at the same time shielding 
heterosexual soldiers from the knowledge that any given individual is gay. 
61. Yoshino, supra note 18, at 554. 
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series of experiments to determine at what level of participation (0-
35 % ) women would lower unit performance in combat and non­
combat contexts. The Army found that women's participation had no 
adverse affect on unit performance, at least up to the 35% level 
tested.62 This same spirit of experimentation could be applied to test 
the relative performance of the inclusive and exclusive commands in 
both stages I and II. 
The volunteerism of the inclusive command mobilizes the power of 
heterosexual allies - forcing them to decide whether they prefer to 
stand with the intolerant or the tolerant. Some heterosexuals might 
prefer not to make this choice, but when confronted with the decision, 
many - like the jurors in Twelve Angry Men - will step away from 
the table of bigotry. 
The inclusive command strategy admittedly treats integration of 
the forces as an incremental process. It permits some service members 
to keep themselves apart (or, under the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, 
to persuade themselves that they are staying apart) from people they 
dislike. Such a system of separation would not offer a satisfying end 
point for any attempt to integrate gay and lesbian soldiers into the 
Military. But one of the central qualities of the inclusive command 
strategy is that it is a dynamic rather than static proposal - a means to 
an end rather than a goal in itself. Creating separate spaces (based 
upon the level of openness about homosexuality and people's 
preferences for that) can contribute to the overarching goal of 
ultimate, undifferentiated integration of the armed forces by sexual 
minorities. 
Granted, inclusive commands might begin as much smaller entities 
than exclusive commands. As homosexuality gains growing acceptance 
in our society, however, the number of people opting for inclusive 
commands should increase. Over time, exclusive commands might 
shrink, eventually becoming a sort of vestigial organ, so dispensable 
that the costs of maintaining separate facilities would outweigh the 
military benefits. At that point, soldiers with the real "problem" - an 
inability or unwillingness to serve with fellow soldiers who are openly 
gay - would be subject to exclusion. In this dynamic version of 
integration strategy, the stigma eventually falls on soldiers who are 
prejudiced rather than those who are gay. This in turn might create 
incentives for soldiers to rid themselves of their prejudices, or at least 
put those prejudices aside when it is time to serve their country. 
62. MAJ. GEN. JEANNE HOLM, USAF (RET.), WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 257-58 (rev. ed., Presidio Press 1992) (1982); ESKRIDGE & 
HUNTER, supra note 48, at 345-46. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THE INCLUSIVE COMMAND 
The foregoing analysis lays out the theoretical arguments for 
adopting the self-segregation of the inclusive command. But we did 
not delve into the details of implementation and a host of nitty-gritty 
inquiries: What should be the wording of the questions asked? What 
precisely should turn on the answers? Can the military effectively 
function with both inclusive and exclusive commands? And finally, 
will anyone actually opt for the inclusive command? It is to these 
practical questions that we now turn. In essence, we hope to have 
already convinced you that the idea has appeal. Here we try to answer 
the question: will it actually work? 
A. What Questions Should Be Asked? 
There are many different ways to frame the basic questions in 
stages I and II. And, as in other contexts, the framing can have 
important impacts on the way that people would respond. In stage I, 
we have suggested that the self-sorting question be phrased: 
Would you prefer to serve in a command without any gay 
personnel? 
But we might have framed the question in the affirmative instead: 
"Would you be willing to serve in a command with gay personnel?" 
Or "Would you volunteer to serve in a command with gay personnel?" 
These different phrases might tease out different levels of support. 
Some soldiers who wouldn't "volunteer" to serve with gays might 
nevertheless "be willing" to serve if asked. Many soldiers simply might 
not care whether their colleagues are gay or not. We have chosen to 
frame the question in the negative - as a way of partitioning those 
who have an affirmative desire to avoid gay colleagues from those who 
are merely neutral. We predict that soldiers who don't care or don't 
have a problem with gays will answer this question "no," and be 
channeled into the inclusive command. 
One might argue that the phrasing will have little effect on the 
answers, because the soldiers will quickly see through the question and 
focus on what turns on it - whether they will be assigned to the 
inclusive or exclusive command. By this argument, the question itself 
becomes irrelevant, and you might as easily base assignments on the 
question, "Is the moon made of cheese?" But from the perspective of 
an individual soldier, what turns on her answer is importantly 
determined by how other soldiers answer the question. A soldier's 
perception of how many other soldiers are neutral about gay 
personnel versus how many affirmatively desire to serve alongside 
gays is likely quite different. Framing the question differently is likely 
to produce different focal points. We have chosen a frame that 
attempts to channel the truly intolerant toward the exclusive 
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command, while channeling the tolerant and the indifferent toward 
the inclusive. 
We have also considered whether the question should expressly 
respond to potential "tipping" anxiety of heterosexual soldiers. Some 
soldiers might be willing to serve in an inclusive command, but only if 
the proportion of the unit that is gay remained below a certain level. 
Even if heterosexual soldiers responded in the abstract that they were 
willing to serve with openly gay people, in actual practice they might 
feel differently. Each soldier might have a "tipping point" beyond 
which his enthusiasm for an inclusive command would wane. 
For example, while some heterosexual soldiers would be happy to 
serve in a command where 10% of the soldiers were openly gay, they 
might be less comfortable in a command where 75% of the soldiers 
were gay. This could be true for a number of reasons. In the 75% 
command, heterosexual soldiers might fear that the ambiguity of the 
inclusive command would be reduced, and that observers would 
assume that any given individual within the unit is gay. Other 
heterosexual soldiers might worry that the atmosphere of the 
command would change somehow if the percentage of the unit that 
was gay exceeded a certain point. Between 10 and 75 % ,  however, the 
tipping point is unclear. At what point would the proportion of gay 
soldiers in the unit become so large that no heterosexual soldiers 
would wish to remain in the unit, thus rendering it a "gay command" 
rather than an "inclusive" one? Even heterosexuals who genuinely 
support gay rights might still avoid patronizing gay bars or vacationing 
in certain sections of Fire Island. 
This tipping anxiety is of course related to the challenge of 
ambiguation. Some heterosexuals might be comfortable with letting 
their audience entertain the possibility that there is a 5% chance that 
they are gay, but would become very uncomfortable if the audience 
thought there was a 50% chance that they were gay. This tipping 
anxiety was vividly displayed on a plane trip we took to Boston. By 
chance, the flight included several dozen members of the New York 
City Gay Men's Chorus. The heterosexual men on the flight were in 
the minority and some seemed to go to unusual conversational lengths 
to disambiguate themselves. 
Collective action problems of this type could make it difficult to 
form a truly inclusive command from the very outset; heterosexual 
soldiers might be unwilling to opt for this command unless they felt 
assured that a significant number of other heterosexual soldiers would 
do the same. Just as we might ask the maximum percentage of the 
command that could be gay within an integrated unit before tipping 
would occur, so too we could ask the minimum percentage that would 
have to be heterosexual in order to get it off the ground. 
In stage I, the tipping problem might be suppressed because 
soldiers would be much less aware of the percentage of the command 
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that is gay. The tipping problem in stage I might also relate to the size 
of the inclusive command. Especially early in the experiment, there 
may be fear among heterosexual soldiers that low total participation in 
the inclusive command will result in the assumption that only gay 
soldiers opted in. Thus, in stage I, total participation in the inclusive 
command will act as a proxy for what percentage of each command is 
gay, since that factor is unknown. Heterosexual service members may 
be hesitant to join an inclusive command unless the total participation 
in such commands comprises a substantial percentage of the military. 
This would combat the presumption that all the members are gay 
because there would just be too many. Many service members may 
assume that approximately 10% (the highest, but also most popular 
estimate) of the population is gay. The exact percentage of the 
military that is gay or lesbian is unknown.63 But if 20% of recruits 
joined the inclusive command, fears may be assuaged. This doesn't 
contradict the idea that every soldier has a specific theoretical tipping 
point. However, even if a particular soldier's theoretical tipping point 
were exceeded by the actual number of gay people in the command, 
he would not know this and thus would not engage in the "straight 
flight" that would cause the tipping to occur. On the other hand, the 
very fact that a soldier has a tipping point and cannot know when it 
has been exceeded might cause him to avoid the inclusive command 
altogether. Thus, the inability to measure the percentage of the 
command that is gay does not necessarily help the inclusive command 
to recruit heterosexual soldiers. What starts as a tipping problem 
becomes a recruitment problem - we don't have to worry about 
heterosexual soldiers tipping out of the command if they won't join it 
to begin with. 
Some recruits might prefer to qualify their willingness to serve in 
the inclusive command by indicating that if the percentage of gay 
people exceeded a certain level (10%; 35% ;  50% ,  for example), they 
would prefer the exclusive command. To these people, the military 
could offer conditional membership in the inclusive command; soldiers 
could specify their tipping point and would be free to transfer to the 
exclusive command if the number of gay people in the inclusive 
command exceeded their disclosed tipping point. However, a cascade 
effect might occur in such a system: when individuals at the 10% point 
are allowed to transfer, the command may as a result reach 35% gay, 
allowing more service members to transfer. 
63. Some evidence suggests that gay men are equally represented, and lesbians 
overrepresented, in the military as compared to their numbers in the general population. See 
THEODORE R. SARBIN & KENNETH E. KAROLS, DEF. PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH 
AND EDUC. CfR., NONCONFORMING SEXUAL ORIENTATIONS AND MILITARY SUITABILITY 
at C-5 (1988); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: 
Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992). 
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Moreover, this approach would be difficult to implement, because 
the stage I screening mechanisms proposed thus far do not ask (and 
under DADT cannot ask) about soldiers' sexual orientations, only 
their preferences with respect to the sexual orientations of their peers. 
Without a separate question that seeks to discover soldiers' sexual 
orientations, military officials could not know who was gay, making it 
impossible to tell when the maximum gay percentage had been 
reached. 
For information gathering purposes, then, the army could 
administer an anonymous survey, asking each recruit to state his or 
her sexual orientation. Two problems immediately arise with such a 
survey: accuracy and legality. The results from any such survey might 
be wildly inaccurate. Promises of anonymity are often insufficient to 
induce truthful answers to questions about homosexuality. And 
directly asking the question would violate the "don't ask" portion 
of DADT. 
But the army might get a more accurate count of gay and lesbian 
soldiers if it used a "randomized response" approach, in which 
respondents are instructed to privately flip a coin. If it is heads, they 
answer the question "Are you gay" truthfully; if it is tails, they answer 
the question "yes" no matter what the truth is. A "yes," in other 
words, does not require respondents to reveal anything about 
themselves, because only the individual soldier knows the result of the 
coin flip. But if 53 % of 1000 respondents should answer yes, the 
military would have a good idea that 6% of the group was gay.64 This 
randomization preserves anonymity by giving the "yes" responders 
plausible deniability, but allows researchers to estimate the proportion 
of gays in the aggregate.65 
64. In a 1991 study by Overlooked Opinions designed to discover the percentage of gay 
men who had tested HIV positive, researchers used both direct techniques (direct questions 
with promises of anonymity) and randomized response techniques. Of the respondents who 
were surveyed using direct methods, 4% said they were HIV positive. Of those surveyed 
using randomized response techniques, 11 % said they were HIV positive. Press Release, 
Overlooked Opinions, Inc., Apples and Oranges [hereinafter Apples and Oranges] (on file 
with author). 
65. Unfortunately, some researchers have found that respondents' aversion to 
homosexuality is so strong that they will even disobey instructions in order to avoid 
answering "yes" to a question about homosexual activity. In one study, the coin flip was 
actually observed by hidden camera, and 26% of respondents instructed to answer "yes" to 
the question "have you ever had a homosexual experience" disregarded the coin flip and 
answered "no." Apples and Oranges, supra note 64 (discussing survey methodologies and 
the variations in reported numbers of homosexuals). Such disregard for the instructions 
would cause the survey to underreport the number of respondents who were gay. A second 
problem with such a survey is that it might violate both the "don't ask" and "don't tell" 
portions of DADT. But to our minds, the randomization of the coin-flipping mechanism 
avoids a legal problem because the military does not solicit identifiable information about 
individual service members' sexual orientation. 
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If this coin-flipping survey revealed that the number of gay people 
in the inclusive command had exceeded the tipping points of some 
members, then the army even in stage I could respond to "tipping" 
anxiety. It could offer transfers to soldiers who had expressed a 
discomfort with serving with too many gays. In this way, the army 
would manage tipping by keeping track of aggregate numbers; and it 
would not be necessary to know the orientation of any given soldier.66 
Ultimately, we reject the idea of soliciting detailed discriminatory 
preferences from the troops, because it might tend to reify and 
reinforce the very preferences we are trying to obliterate. The military 
should take seriously the risk that "straight flight" will turn the 
inclusive command de facto into a segregated gay commancl But the 
solution to the tipping problem is found in effective training, not 
catering to homophobia. Prior to assignment, every recruit could 
complete an information-rich training program which would describe 
the inclusive command. In this training program, recruits would learn 
that DADT's prohibition on asking about service members' sexual 
orientation prevents military officials from knowing ex ante the 
proportion of any command - inclusive or exclusive - that is actually 
gay or lesbian. Indeed, the military might consider posing the sorting 
questions to recruits after they have completed basic training, where 
the military already stresses unity and tolerance for difference. 
Recruits who opt for an inclusive command in stage I would accept 
that assignment on the premise that DADT would prevent gay and 
lesbian members of the command from identifying themselves. In 
stage II, recruits would join the inclusive command knowing that some 
of their fellow service members might come out as gay or lesbian. 
With time and effective training, it is possible that many heterosexual 
soldiers would internally adjust their tipping point upward. 
B. What Should Turn on the Answers? 
Arguably, the assignment given to a soldier who says he is willing 
to serve with gay people should have no special label at all; it should 
just be "the army." This complete integration is the ultimate goal of 
the inclusive command approach. As a first step, however, giving 
labels to the two different commands can help create the appropriate 
focal point for self-segregation of the tolerant and intolerant. Naming 
66. In stage II, the army might try to manage tipping more directly by imposing a quota 
on the number of openly gay soldiers that were assigned to particular inclusive commands. 
But quotas are unlikely to be effective, because gay and lesbian soldiers could closet 
themselves in order to gain admission to the inclusive unit. And quotas would expose gay 
and lesbian soldiers to a new type of discrimination that ultimately rests on the 
discriminatory preferences of their colleagues, partially negating the goal of the inclusive 
command. 
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the two commands is problematic, however. It could prove difficult to 
find word pairs that avoid any connotation of hierarchy or stigma. 
But we should pause to consider whether the military should 
stigmatize those soldiers who opt for the exclusive command. 
Identifying and stigmatizing bigots is a worthy goal for reasons besides 
the recognition of gay rights. Research on anti-Semitism shows that 
people who express prejudice on the basis of one characteristic (such 
as religion) are likely to express prejudice on the basis of other 
characteristics as well (such as race or national origin).67 In an 
organization that relies upon soldiers' ability to work together and 
defend each other, prejudice can be costly. A soldier who is willing to 
express prejudice on the basis of sexual orientation may also be 
harboring prejudice on the basis of race or religion, not so willingly 
expressed (because such prejudices are less socially acceptable than 
homophobia). Soldiers who opt for the exclusive command might be 
inadvertently signaling an inability to work not only with openly gay 
people, but with people of diverse races, religions, or ethnic 
backgrounds as well. Soldiers who join an inclusive command, on the 
other hand - particularly heterosexual soldiers who do so - might in 
general be more tolerant of and receptive to differences within the 
ranks. This receptivity could foster greater unity in an already diverse 
military force. 
There is, however, a serious risk attendant to any stigmatization of 
the exclusive command. Social attitudes, like sexual orientation, can 
be masked. If soldiers join an inclusive command not because they are 
comfortable serving with gay people, but because they wish to avoid 
the negative aspects of the alternative command, then some soldiers 
with anti-gay prejudice (people we might call "closeted bigots") could 
end up in an inclusive command. These closeted bigots could be bad 
for unit cohesion in the inclusive command. In stage I, although 
DADT would prevent them from identifying gay or lesbian soldiers 
with certainty, they could nonetheless decrease morale by making 
derogatory remarks about gay men and lesbians. In stage II, in 
addition to harassing the soldiers who came out, the closeted bigots 
might seek somehow to pit heterosexual soldiers against openly gay 
soldiers within an inclusive command. If the inclusive command is to 
have its desired demonstration effect, then soldiers who are likely to 
display or foment anti-gay prejudice should be discouraged from 
joining it. Stigmatizing the exclusive command could drive some 
soldiers to an inclusive command who are not really "qualified" to join 
it. In this sense, the inclusive command has its own exclusive qualities, 
because it bars people who express anti-gay sentiment. 
67. See Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science 
Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between "Different" Minorities, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 313 (2000). 
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If we wish to avoid stigmatizing either of the commands, we should 
devise names that are parallel and politically neutral. But this could 
prove difficuJt. If the command admitting openly gay people is 
"inclusive," is the other command "exclusive"? The word exclusive 
sometimes connotes a kind of elitism or superiority. But other word 
pairs - "tolerant"/"intolerant";  "may ask, may tell"/"don't ask, 
don't tell", etc. - are also value laden. Labeling the divisions by 
number does not solve the problem, because the lower number will 
inevitably communicate priority or hierarchy. To avoid these 
problems, we could choose labels that are not descriptive in any real 
sense, such as animals ("cougar" command/"tiger" command) or 
colors ("green" unit/"red" unit). 
And for parallel reasons, the substantive assignments and career 
opportunities of soldiers who opt for the exclusive command should 
not be impaired. The military should resist the urge to statistically 
discriminate against these intolerant soldiers, again because such 
discrimination is likely to cause them to suppress their true feelings. A 
reverse tipping problem in which all soldiers opted for the inclusive 
command in stage I would not be an improvement over the current 
system. Of course, at some level it will be difficult to avoid the 
politicization of choice. Just as judicial nominees are judged on their 
decisions to join restrictive clubs, candidates for the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff one day would likely be judged on whether they preferred to 
associate with the intolerant. The point here is that the military should 
to the extent practicable reduce and disconnect the career and social 
consequences of opting for one command or the other. Over time, any 
word that we give to the exclusive command is likely to become 
tainted by repeated connection to its unworthy substance. But the 
mechanism should at least begin by putting the commands on an equal 
and neutral footing. 
Whatever the name attached to the inclusive command, it should 
be integrated rather than exclusively gay. Creating a "gay ghetto" 
within the military could more severely stigmatize the soldiers who 
join this unit, singling out the people who are not the sole or even the 
primary cause of the problems surrounding sexuality and the military. 
Given the hostility many feel toward homosexuality, a command that 
was exclusively gay could be vulnerable to hostile reactions from 
soldiers outside the unit, reactions that could range from a general 
lack of support to "fragging," in which service members fire on their 
own people with malicious motive.68 The presence of heterosexual 
soldiers within an inclusive command would help to dilute this effect, 
insulating gay and lesbian soldiers from the negative reactions they 
would likely engender in some fellow soldiers outside the unit. 
68. The term "fragging" was popularized during the Vietnam War, when enlisted men 
would occasionally fire on their own junior officers. 
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In her defense of the ban on gays in the military, Melissa Wells­
Petry argues that grouping or segregating soldiers by certain behaviors 
can be detrimental to their relationships with fellow soldiers: 
This phenomenon already is observed in military culture when soldiers 
are grouped - in social not official terms _..:. by behavior, or potential 
behavior, that is considered substandard for soldiering. These groups of 
soldiers frequently become a focal point for reinforcing the military 
identity of the larger group . . . .  
Desirable or not, this social phenomenon is a reaffirmation of the 
larger group's identity as "real" soldiers. Nevertheless, this social 
phenomenon clearly can go too far and result in divisiveness. Controlling 
this natural social phenomenon would be more difficult if soldiers were 
grouped by non-military behavior as a matter of official policy.69 
The inclusive command system would group soldiers by their 
expressed willingness to serve with openly gay colleagues. This 
willingness would not be, in Wells-Petry's words, "non-military" or 
"substandard" behavior, but rather would be crucially tied to work as 
members of the armed services. 
At this point it is important to remember the important role 
commanding officers can play in implementing strategies like the 
inclusive command. One might even enlist the support of "norm 
entrepreneurs" such as H. Norman Schwartzkopf, Wesley Clark, or 
Colin Powell. They might make clear that if they were called upon to 
answer the key question, simply on their own behalf, they would 
indicate a willingness to serve with gay and lesbian service members. 
Indeed, given their praise of gay and lesbian former service members, 
Schwartzkopf and Powell could likely express this personal view 
without contradicting their 1990's Congressional testimony on unit 
cohesion. If norm entrepreneurs were able to endorse the inclusive 
command as a good thing, such statements might play a role analogous 
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Brown, creating an 
environment conducive to voluntary integration efforts. 
But even if the problems of tipping and stigma proved so 
intractable that the inclusive command became in actuality a gay 
command, we needn't conclude that the experiment has failed. 
Instead, we might see the gay command as an interim step (stage I.a., 
perhaps) toward an integrated inclusive command (probably renamed, 
in order to disrupt the signal that "inclusive" = "gay"), which in turn 
would be an interim step toward full integration. The process of 
integrating gay and lesbian soldiers would be broken into smaller 
increments, but the cause of gay rights would nonetheless move 
forward. 
69. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 169-70. 
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C. Administrative Burdens 
The inclusive command system this Essay proposes would 
admittedly impose on military administrators additional layers of cost 
and procedure that could prove onerous. First, we must acknowledge 
the additional costs if the military attempted to implement an inclusive 
command system by creating two duplicative sets of resources - one 
for each type of command. The costs of keeping the inclusive and 
exclusive commands separate but indeed equal could be prohibitive. 
The greater the administrative burden created by a dual-command 
system, the more difficult it becomes for the army to meet other 
demands on commanders' time and energy. The very process of 
determining the appropriate command for a new soldier, for example, 
would consume precious resources. If soldiers retained the option of 
moving from exclusive to inclusive commands (or vice versa), this too 
could impose additional administrative costs. While soldiers are 
trained to be flexible, able to adapt to new conditions and 
requirements, it is also a hallmark of military training that strong 
emphasis is placed on esprit de corps. Undue movement of personnel 
from one command to another could jeopardize unit cohesion in ways 
that a few openly gay soldiers staying in one place never would. 
Military officials might also object that the division of soldiers into 
inclusive and exclusive units would be artificial and potentially 
temporary. If the soldiers were called to combat, it would be difficult, 
if not impossible, to maintain the separation of the two units. They 
might fight in coordinated or even combined fashion. Experiences of 
gay and lesbian soldiers who have served suggest, however, that the 
more exigent the circumstances under which soldiers are working, the 
less important anyone's sexual orientation seems to be.70 Perhaps at 
such times, particularly, unit cohesion turns not on personal 
characteristics, but on the extent to which troops can count on each 
other to fight effectively and rescue endangered comrades. Not 
coincidentally, the military has been willing to overlook members' 
homosexuality in order to maximize personnel in times of war.71 As 
70. Cal Anderson, Army Specialist-6, recounts, "We were situated about a mile from 
the Viet Cong. Being that close to possible death, I think the people were a lot more tolerant 
of each other, and most people kind of looked out for each other. There wasn't a lot of fear 
of getting caught, exposed, or kicked out of the Army for any particular infraction." 
HUMPHREY, supra note 16, at 64. J.W. "Skip" Godsey, a former enlisted man and officer 
who served in the Army from 1967-70 and in the Navy from 1970-86, says, "(I]n combat you 
didn't really give a fuck what men did and what men didn't do . . . .  It didn't make a . . .  
difference whether he was black, white, queer, or straight . . . .  "). Id. at 210. 
71. See SHILTS, supra note 13, at 726-27 (noting that as part of a "stop-loss" policy 
designed to reduce discharges from the armed forces and ensure adequate manpower, 
reservists who admitted their homosexuality were told by commanders that "they did not 
care - the reservists would be mobilized like any other soldier"). But see Lou Chibbaro Jr., 
Navy 'Stop-Loss' Order Bars Gays, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 5, 2001 (on file with author) 
(reporting that the U.S. Air Force and Navy had instituted a "stop-loss" policy to limit 
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the United States has coordinated peacekeeping efforts with other 
members of the United Nations and NATO, moreover, American 
troops have worked closely with soldiers from countries that permit 
openly gay people to serve.72 
In the wake of the rulings by the European Court of Human 
Rights requiring Great Britain to include openly gay people in its 
military forces,73 such interaction can only increase. Britain has been 
the United States' greatest supporter in the war on terrorism declared 
in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 ;  the UK has also 
deployed thousands of troops in Iraq. Not only do gay soldiers serve 
this and other countries' interest in staffing at times of crisis, they may 
disturb the average heterosexual soldier less at such times than in 
peace times. Geoffrey Bateman and Sameera Dalvi studied openly 
gay, non-American service members who have served with Americans 
in multinational military units or operations. They concluded that U.S. 
personnel are able to interact and work successfully with 
acknowledged gay personnel from foreign militaries. Institutionally, 
they found, "neither NATO nor the United Nations has addressed the 
coordination of divergent policies concerning sexual orientation in an 
official manner, largely because these organizations are preoccupied 
with more pressing concerns, and because homosexual personnel are 
not seen as sources of tension, even for U.S. personnel."74 As studies 
like Bateman and Dalvi's multiply, military leaders will gain further 
assurance that inclusive and exclusive commands could be coordinated 
and even combined in times of crisis without sacrificing military 
effectiveness. 
Although "unit cohesion" is the central rationale now for 
excluding openly gay and lesbian citizens from the military, 
commanders and commentators have from time to time cited other 
administrative rationales for the ban, such as health care costs and 
security risks. For example, Melissa Wells-Petry, a strong opponent of 
discharges in wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, but that discharges for violations of 
DADT would continue). 
72. NAT'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., RAND CORP., MR-323-0SD, SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 11-12 
(1993) [hereinafter RAND]. 
73. Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96 & 32377/96, 29 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 548 (1999); Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 33985/96 & 33986/96, 
29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 493 (1999); see also Philip Britton, Gay and Lesbian Rights in the United 
Kingdom: The Story Continued, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 207, 233 (2000) (detailing 
the court decisions which led to the new British policy of "don't ask, can tell"). Early reports 
indicate that the change has not been difficult to implement. See Sarah Lyall, Gays in the 
British Military: Ask, Tell and Then Move On, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2001, at Al. 
74. Geoffrey Bateman & Sameera Dalvi, Ctr. for the Study of Sexual Minorities 
in the Military, Univ. of Cal., Santa Barbara, Multinational Military Units and 
Homosexual Personnel (Feb. 2004), at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/2004_ 
02_BatemanSameera.htm. 
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gays in the military, has devoted many pages to detailed description� 
of the "sexual practices" of gay men and lesbians, at least in part75 to 
explain why health care costs may be greater for gay service members 
than for straight ones. Because she provides no analogously detailed 
description of the "sexual practices" of heterosexuals and the medical 
conditions resulting from that activity (including pregnancy), she fails 
to make the case that health care costs are likely to be particularly or 
uniquely high for gay and lesbian soldiers. Even if gay men or lesbians 
in the general population are prone to particular health problems, we 
lack evidence that gay and lesbian soldiers share these health care 
needs. And even if evidence suggested that gay and lesbian service 
members had up to now exhibited certain behaviors or health care 
needs, it is possible that soldiers in an inclusive unit would be 
different. 
For example, even if gay soldiers' need for secrecy about their 
sexual orientation under DADT has created high stress levels and led 
to substance abuse or mental health problems,76 it is possible that gay 
soldiers in the inclusive unit, with more support and less at stake in 
concealing aspects of their identity, would suffer significantly less 
stress and fewer stress-induced health problems.77 Although Wells­
Petry cites data suggesting that gay men and lesbians are vulnerable to 
certain types of sexually transmitted diseases,78 she cites no evidence 
that military gays would contract such diseases at a rate any higher 
75. One suspects that another motivation for including this material is to shock or 
disgust readers. Some of the information about sexual practices seems fairly irrelevant to the 
question of military service. For example, Wells-Petry discusses in detail some rather exotic 
sexual habits found in only a small percentage of a select sample of gay men. See WELLS­
PETRY, supra note 12, at 101. More common activities she discusses - such as "oral-genital 
contact" - are also practiced by heterosexuals, see EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 98-99 
tbl.3.6 (1994), but Wells-Petry includes no information about sexually transmitted diseases 
among heterosexuals and the sexual practices that help to spread them. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 631, 635 (1999) ("At least 
three-quarters of the straight population, including the President of the United States, have 
engaged in oral sex (many of them regularly), and almost a fourth have engaged in anal 
sex"). No doubt many readers of Wells-Petry's book would also be shocked and disgusted to 
read detailed accounts of some heterosexual sex. Cf WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY 
OF DISGUST (1997) (describing the disgust heterosexual sex has engendered in many 
cultures). 
76. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 114 (observing that gay men and lesbians are 
likely to suffer stress stemming from "secrecy, disapproval and often internalized shame"). 
77. This in turn could make these gay and lesbian soldiers even more productive than 
they are able to be under the "don't ask, don't tell" regime, where some energy is inevitably 
wasted in the effort to maintain the secrecy of their sexual orientation. See HUMPHREY, 
supra note 16, at 71 ("[T]hat energy to hide should be channeled in more positive ways . . . .  
It's too bad, and the military loses"). 
78. See WELLS-PETRY, supra note 12, at 102-10. 
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than heterosexuals do within the military.79 Assuming that gay men 
and lesbians within the military resemble the gay and lesbian 
population generally, or that if allowed to serve openly they would 
behave in a manner consistent with studies of certain gay and lesbian 
populations, may be unfounded. An inclusive command would permit 
gay and lesbian soldiers to demonstrate not only the types of soldiers 
they can be, but also the specific costs and benefits which would be 
derived from their presence in the military. 
The final point to be demonstrated by the inclusive command is 
that gay and lesbian soldiers would pose no increased risk to security. 
Although in recent years opponents of gays in the military seem to 
have abandoned this untenable rationale for exclusion, for some time 
common wisdom held that homosexuality made a person vulnerable to 
coercion or seduction into espionage activity. Closeted gay men and 
lesbians, it was said, would cooperate with hostile governments in 
order to protect the secret of their sexual orientation; even people 
who were open about their own sexual orientation might be more 
vulnerable if they wished to protect the identities of closeted sexual 
partners.80 Logic and evidence have proven this theory wrong. As a 
matter of logic, the inclusive command would greatly mitigate the 
danger that gay or lesbian soldiers would betray their country in order 
to protect the secret of their own sexual orientation, because in a stage 
II inclusive command, their sexual orientation would already be 
generally known or would not be a matter bearing on their careers if it 
were revealed.81 The evidence shows that gay men and lesbians are no 
more likely to betray their country than heterosexuals are.82 
Just as voluntary, incremental integration can solve the "unit 
cohesion" problem, so too the inclusive command could demonstrate 
that these additional administrative rationales are unfounded. Some 
military warnings of increased administrative burdens are empirical 
claims unsupported by relevant data. The inclusive command system 
79. Similarly, the ability to be open about their partners and significant others might 
make it easier for gay and lesbian soldiers to preserve monogamous relationships, thus 
reducing extra-curricular sexual activity and consequent vulnerability to sexually transmitted 
diseases, something Wells-Petry emphasizes. 
80. See SHILTS, supra note 13, at 682. 
81. We have argued, however, that even in an inclusive command soldiers might be out 
to some people but not others. They might be open about their sexual orientation with 
coworkers within the military but not, say, with their parents. Thus it is not the case that a 
member of an inclusive command has nothing to lose if someone were to threaten publicity 
about sexual orientation. Rather, one of the crucially destructive consequences of that 
revelation under the current system - discharge, often dishonorable, from the military -
could not be part of the threat delivered to a soldier in a stage II inclusive command. 
82. See Melinda S. Cooper, Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation in Military and 
Security Contexts: An Analysis of Recent Federal Decisions, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 201 (1993) 
(noting that in 1 17  cases of espionage by U.S. citizens analyzed, only 7 of the defendants 
were gay or lesbian). 
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creates an opportunity to gather relevant data. Only in this way can we 
determine the strength of these empirical claims masquerading as 
normative statements. 
D. But Will Anyone Join? 
Although behavior under changed norms can be difficult to 
predict, it is not unrealistic to think that a substantial number of 
heterosexual soldiers would opt for the inclusive command. Our 
position is that many non-gay people are looking for ways to stand up 
for the rights of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people. For supportive 
heterosexual people inclined to serve in the military, the inclusive 
command would provide yet another way to work for the equality of 
gay people. 
Randy Shilts writes about Greg Teran, a heterosexual man who 
attended MIT with the help of an Air Force ROTC scholarship. Teran 
was troubled by the military's anti-gay policy. When assigned to do a 
full briefing on "any military-related issue" for an ROTC class, he 
"delivered a report to the fifteen other Air Force cadets and his unit 
commander arguing that the regulations banning gays should be 
rescinded."83 Teran eventually began to work for change, attending a 
national conference of organizers whose goal was the elimination of 
ROTC chapters from college campuses unless the Defense 
Department lifted the ban on gays.84 Teran once told a flight 
commander that his goal for military service was to "serve in an Air 
Force that did not discriminate on race, sex, or sexual orientation."85 
In his book, Honor Bound, Joseph Steffan writes that when he was 
expelled from the Naval Academy because of his homosexuality, his 
heterosexual friends were loyal supporters.86 Greg Teran and Steffan's 
friends give us reason to believe that some heterosexuals already in 
the armed forces would choose an inclusive command if it were an 
option.87 Moreover, it is possible that the existence of an inclusive 
83. SHILTS, supra note 13, at 732. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. JOSEPH STEFFAN, HONOR BOUND: A GAY AMERICAN FIGHTS FOR THE RIGHT TO 
SERVE HIS COUNTRY 157 (1992). 
87. See id. As Shilts writes: 
That y oung men like Greg Teran had taken up the cause indicated that among a segment of 
the young heterosexual population was the dawning awareness that something was wrong in 
the way society treated gay s, and that they must help do something about it. It was surely not 
a social phenomenon, but it suggested a future in which homosexuals would not be 
altogether alone in their fight for social acceptance. 
SHILTS, supra note 13, at 732-33. 
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command might draw people to the military who would otherwise 
forego service.88 
Recent surveys suggest that public acceptance of gays and lesbians 
in the U.S. military has grown since DADT was first implemented. A 
2000 study found that between 1994 and 1999, the percentage of Navy 
officers who "feel uncomfortable in the presence of homosexuals" 
decreased from 57.8% to 36.4%.89 An even more recent CNN/Gallup 
poll conducted in December 2003 found that 79% of all Americans 
believed that gay and lesbian service members should be able to serve 
openly in the military. Among respondents ages 18-29, the percentage 
was even higher: an astounding 91 % supported the right of openly gay 
people to serve.90 This last statistic is particularly important, since it 
reveals the views of the age group most likely to be serving in the U.S. 
military. If these trends continue, there may be reason to expect that a 
critical mass of service members would express a willingness to serve 
in an inclusive command. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Essay proposes a new, incremental way to integrate sexual 
minorities into the U.S. military: "inclusive commands." Built on a 
system of voluntary self-assignment, the inclusive command and its 
counterpart, the exclusive command, would permit soldiers to sort by 
their attitudes toward homosexuality. 
But is integration of the military really a worthy goal for gay rights 
advocates, allies, and policymakers? Certainly, many theorists have 
raised legitimate concerns about the ways the military reinforces patri­
archy and constructs masculinity to the disadvantage of women and 
people of color.91 One might point out that exclusion from the military, 
especially combat, keeps openly gay people out of harm's way. 
88. See Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 69 (1999) ("Those 
who choose not to participate can have a more powerful effect in creating an 
unrepresentative military than specific policies that limit or exclude . . . .  "). 
89. Associated Press, Polls Show Reduction Of Soldiers' Opposition To Gays (Aug. 7, 
2001 ), available at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/ResearchResources/PressClips/news8_ 7 
_01.htm (citing study conducted by Major John W. Bicknell of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, Cal.); see also Press Release, Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in 
the Military, University of California, Santa Barbara, Polls Show Reduction of Soldiers' 
Opposition to Gays: New Surveys Examine Shifting Attitudes Among Military and Civilian 
Populations (Aug. 6, 2001), available at http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/press_ 
rel9.htm. (summarizing data from one study showing that only 37% of Army men and 16% 
of Army women "strongly opposed" to gay people serving in the military, and another study 
showing only "mild dislike" for gay people among male Marines). 
90. Paul Johnson, Massive Support for Gays in Military Poll Shows, 365Gay.com (Dec. 
24, 2003), at http://www.365gay.com/newscontent/122403militaryPoll.htm. 
91. See, e.g. , Karst, supra note 51, at 502-10. 
October 2004] The Inclusive Command 187 
But focusing exclusively on the costs and dangers of military 
service ignores the fact that inclusion in the military carries with it 
undeniable advantages. These are twofold. First, military service 
confers symbolic value: it simultaneously demonstrates and creates 
patriotism and full citizenship. Second, service in the military carries 
with it material benefits: job training, education, health and retirement 
benefits, and political clout. It is not happenstance that military service 
is an important correlate with success when candidates run for public 
office. 
"Don't ask, don't tell" is an inadequate means of giving gay men 
and lesbians access to these benefits. As many commentators and even 
a few judges have argued, the policy continues to impose on gay and 
lesbian service members burdens that heterosexual soldiers need not 
bear. Nominally in the service of preserving "unit cohesion," the 
DADT policy forces gay and lesbian soldiers to lie about themselves, 
to keep a part of themselves hidden from fellow soldiers, impeding the 
very honesty and intimacy that helps to forge strong bonds of 
friendship and loyalty. From the gay service members' perspective, 
then, DADT does greater damage to their honest relationships with 
fellow soldiers than candor about sexual orientation ever could. 
Moreover, DADT does nothing to test the assumption that 
heterosexual soldiers are incapable of serving with openly gay soldiers. 
To move the debate further and break down these anti-gay 
assumptions, we must create an environment where the assumptions 
can be tested and proven to be unfounded. 
The inclusive command would be one such environment. There, in 
stage I, gay and heterosexual soldiers could express their willingness to 
serve together. In stage II, lifting DADT in the inclusive command 
would allow them to make good on those representations. In the 
inclusive command, gay and heterosexual soldiers could show, with 
discipline and an eye toward duty, that they can work together. With 
the support of commanders who are behind the integrationist goals of 
the unit, soldiers could demonstrate that unit cohesion need not suffer 
in the presence of openly gay soldiers, that sexual tensions can be 
managed, and that privacy can be respected. In the process, much of 
the harm currently imposed by the DADT policy could be 
ameliorated. 
The importance of this support from higher ranking officers cannot 
be overemphasized. As the RAND report concluded when it summa­
rized its recommendations: "Any sense of experimentation or uncer­
tainty invites those opposed to change to continue to resist and to seek 
to 'prove' that the change will not work."92 Although this Essay has 
referred repeatedly to the demonstration effects of the inclusive 
92. RAND, supra note 72, at xxix. 
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command and the opportunities for gathering data that it offers, 
commanders would have to make clear to all service members that the 
new regime is not an "experiment," but rather a process which they 
support toward a final goal of full integration. Through the inclusive 
command, the armed forces could come one step closer to the ideal 
Judge Nickerson has described: "A Service called on to fight for the 
principles of equality and free speech embodied in the United States 
Constitution should embrace those principles in its own ranks."93 
93. Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
